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Abstract 
In the wake of Brexit and the Trump tariff war, central banks have had to reconsider the role of 
monetary policy in managing the economic effects of tariff shocks, which may induce a slowdown 
while raising inflation. This paper studies the optimal monetary policy responses using a New 
Keynesian model that includes elements from the trade literature, including global value chains in 
production, firm dynamics, and comparative advantage between two traded sectors. We find that, 
in response to a symmetric tariff war, the optimal policy response is generally expansionary: 
central banks stabilize the output gap at the expense of further aggravating short-run inflation---
contrary to the prescription of the standard Taylor rule. In response to a tariff imposed unilaterally 
by a trading partner, it is optimal to engineer currency depreciation up to offsetting the effects of 
tariffs on relative prices, without completely redressing the effects of the tariff on the broader set 
of macroeconomic aggregates.  
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1. Introduction 
Brexit and the Trump trade wars have ignited a debate over the economic effects of 
tariffs, and the appropriate monetary policy response to the economic slowdown potentially 
induced by these shocks. Much of recent research on the macroeconomic effects of trade 
policy shocks has been conducted in the context of real trade models, or in empirical 
exercises without consideration of monetary policy.1   In the classical literature, there are 
examples of studies focusing on trade policy also as a tool of macroeconomic management. 
But the question facing numerous central banks has been how to respond to a trade policy 
that is either imposed by a foreign country over which it has no control, or reflects a 
domestic government political agenda best modeled as an exogenous shock.   
Tariff shocks combine elements of both demand and supply disturbances, creating a 
policy trade-off between stabilizing inflation (rising per effect of the tariff) or the output 
gap (possibly reflecting a fall in activity).  In recent theoretical research on the topic, 
however, monetary policy is modelled using Taylor rules, without deriving them from 
optimal policy exercises. This approach is tantamount to assuming that monetary 
authorities would focus on countering the inflationary effects of a tariff with monetary 
contraction, possibly exacerbating the associated fall in output (See Barattieri et al. (2018), 
Caldara et al. (2020), and Linde and Pescatori (2019) for examples.)  However, given the 
mix of demand and supply implications of tariffs, it is far from clear that the optimal 
monetary policy response can be approximated by the standard mold of inflation targeting.  
This paper studies Ramsey optimal monetary policy responses to tariff shocks in a 
New Keynesian model that exhibits nominal rigidities, along with several other features 
borrowed from the trade literature particularly relevant for understanding the effects of 
tariffs. The model features (if only in a stylized way) value chains in production, in which 
imported goods are used in the production of exports. This implies that raising tariff 
protection of domestic exporters can also raise the cost of production for domestic firms. 
                                                 
1 See for example Bloom, et al. (2019), Born et al. (2019), Breinlich et al. (2017), Caliendo et al. (2017), 
Davies and Studnicka (2018),  Dhingra et al. (2017), Sampson (2017), Steinberg (2019), and Van Reenen 
(2016). Some recent contributions use monetary models with standard monetary policy rules in the 
background, but these do not derive optimal policy or focus on the monetary response. Important examples 
are Linde and Pescatori (2019), Erceg et al. (2018) and Caldara et al. (2020), as well as Barattieri et al. 
(2018), which goes on to consider two alternative monetary regimes of a zero lower bound and a fixed 
exchange rate.   
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The model also features two traded sectors, one consisting of monopolistically competitive 
differentiated goods, characterized by sticky prices and sunk entry cost, and the other 
perfectly competitive non-differentiated goods, where a country’s comparative advantage 
between sectors is endogenous. As shown in the trade literature, optimal tariff policy can 
be designed with the goal to manipulate comparative advantage. In previous work of ours, 
we have reconsidered the same goal in relation to the optimal design of monetary and 
exchange rate policy (see Bergin and Corsetti, 2019).  In this paper, we bring our two-
country model to bear on both the macroeconomic effects of tariff shocks, and the optimal 
response of monetary policy to such a shock. We carry out our analysis numerically, at first 
focusing on a version of our model with one sector only, then extending our exercises to 
the richer setting. 
Our results are as follows. A symmetric tariff war, in which countries impose 
symmetric tariffs on exports from each other, implies that output falls and inflation rises in 
both countries. The optimal (cooperative) monetary policy response is distinctly 
expansionary. Central banks lower interest rates to stimulate flagging export demand, 
consumption demand, and investment demand. Stabilizing the output gap comes at the 
expense of further aggravating inflation. The characterization of the optimal monetary 
response as expansionary may be surprising, in light of the fact that an unexpected hike in 
tariffs is commonly seen as a supply shock, because of its effect on marginal costs and thus 
on the price of domestic goods.  The Ramsey solution is also at odds with the prescription 
arising from imposing a standard Taylor rule with a large inflation coefficient.  
The optimal domestic response to the alternative scenario of a unilateral tariff shock 
imposed by a trading partner is similarly expansionary. In this scenario, however, the 
optimal home monetary stance engineers currency deprecation with the primary goal to 
offset the impact of the tariff on relative prices, thus containing the distortions impinging 
on efficient production and trade. Yet the optimal policy only imperfectly redresses the 
effects of the tariff on the broader set of macroeconomic aggregates.  
The above results are qualitatively similar in the one- and two-sector versions of our 
model. Quantitatively, however, the two models have different implications. When we 
allow tariff shocks to induce shifts in comparative advantage between multiple sectors, our 
model predicts a significant amplification of their macroeconomic effects, in particular in 
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terms of firm entry dynamics. In this case, monetary policy has a much larger role to play 
in counteracting trade policy distortions. 
Our work is related to a number of recent papers studying macroeconomic effects of 
trade policies in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. Barrattieri et al. (2017) 
and Erceg et al. (2018) study whether tariffs or combinations of trade policies can 
potentially serve as effective tools of macroeconomic stimulus in environments with 
nominal frictions. Caldara et al. (2018) study how trade policy uncertainty can have 
contractionary macroeconomic implications. Linde and Pescatori (2019) study the degree 
to which endogenous exchange rate movements in a macroeconomic environment work to 
offset the real effects of tariffs and export subsidies.  These papers share with our work a 
nominal dimension that goes beyond the standard trade literature, in that they have nominal 
rigidities and specify monetary policy behavior. However, we differ in that our focus is on 
the monetary policy choice. These papers focus on the design and efficacy of tariff policies, 
in an environment that includes a given, standard Taylor monetary policy rule in the 
background. In contrast, we compute the design of the welfare-optimizing monetary policy 
response of a central bank faced by a given, exogenous tariff shock. We also differ in 
considering economic features found important in the trade literature, such as international 
production chains and multiple traded sectors with the resulting shifts in comparative 
advantage.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the model environment 
and calibration. Section 3 presents simulation experiments for scenarios in a one-sector 
version of the model, including a symmetric tariff war and a unilateral foreign tariff. 
Section 4 then shows how results change in the full two-sector model, and section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Model 
The theoretical framework builds upon the monetary comparative advantage model 
developed in Bergin and Corsetti (2019), wherein two countries, home and foreign, each 
produce two types of tradable goods. The first type comes in differentiated varieties 
produced under monopolistic competition.  Firms in this sector face a sunk investment cost 
to enter the market with a new variety, and set prices subject to nominal rigidities; 
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moreover, production may require intermediates in a round-about production structure. The 
second type of good is modeled according to the standard specification in real business 
cycle models, assuming perfect substitutability among producers within a country, but 
imperfect substitutability across countries.  
In the text to follow, we present the households’ and firms’ problems as well as the 
monetary and fiscal policy rules from the vantage point of the home economy, with the 
understanding that similar expressions and considerations apply to the foreign economy—
foreign variables are denoted with a “*”.  
 
2.1.  Goods consumption demand and price indexes 
        Households consume goods produced in both sectors, of domestic and foreign origin. 
The differentiated goods come in many varieties, produced by a time-varying number of 
monopolistically competitive firms in the home and foreign country, nt and nt* 
respectively, each producing a single variety.  Each variety is an imperfect substitute for 
any other variety in this sector, either of home or foreign origin, with elasticity ϕ. The non-
differentiated goods come in a home and foreign version, which are imperfect substitutes 
with elasticity η. However, within each country, all goods in this sector are perfectly 
substitutable with each other, and are produced in a perfectly competitive environment.  
We will refer to the differentiated sector as “manufacturing,” and denote this sector with a 
D; we will denote the non-differentiated sector with a N. 
 Tariffs are specified as ad-valorem duties imposed at the dock. They directly enter 
the relative prices observed by consumers, and which enter the demand equations. Tariff 
revenue is collected by the government of the importing country and rebated to domestic 
consumers, thus canceling out in the consolidated national budget constraint. 
 The overall consumption index is specified as follows: 
Ct CD,t CN ,t1 ,
 
where     
* 11 1
,
0 0
t tn n
D t t tC c h dh c f df

 
 
         
is the index over the endogenous number of home and foreign varieties of the differentiated 
manufacturing good, ct(h) and ct(f), and  
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CN ,t  
1
CH ,t
1
  1  1 CF ,t1




1
 
is the index over goods differentiated only by country of origin, ,H tC and ,F tC with  0,1 
accounting for the weight on domestic goods. The corresponding welfare-based 
consumption price index is  
(1)   
1
, ,
11
D t N t
t
P P
P
 
 

  , 
where   
(2)        111 1*, ,D t t t t t D tP n p h n p f T      
is the index over the prices of all varieties of home and foreign manufacturing goods, pt(h) 
and pt(f), and 
(3)      11 11, , , ,1N t H t F t N tP P P T         
is the index over the prices of home and foreign non-differentiated goods. In these indexes, 
,D tT represents the quantity of 1 plus the ad valorem tariff rate imposed by the home country 
on imports of foreign differentiated goods, and ,N tT represents the quantity of 1 plus the ad-
valorem tariff rate imposed by the home country on imports of foreign non-differentiated 
goods. 
 The relative demand functions for domestic residents implied from our specification 
of preferences are listed below: 
(4,5) , ,/D t t t D tC P C P   , ,1 /N t t t N tC PC P    
(6,7)   , ,( ) /t t D t D tc h p h P C    , , ,( ) /t t D t D t D tc f p f T P C   
(8,9)  , , , ,/H t H t N t N tC P P C     , , , , ,1 /F t F t N t N t N tC P T P C     
 
2.2  Home households’ problem 
 The representative home household derives utility from consumption (Ct), and from 
holding real money balances (Mt/Pt); it suffers disutility from labor (lt). The household 
budget consists of labor income from working at the nominal wage rate Wt;  profits rebated 
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from home firms denoted with  in real terms and defined below, as well as interest 
income on bonds in home currency (it-1BH,t-1) and foreign currency (it-1*BF,t-1), where et is 
the nominal exchange rate in units of home currency per foreign. Income is net of lump-
sum taxes (Tt ), used for monetary transfers and to rebate tariff payments on imports. It is 
assumed that consumers do not internalize the effects of their consumption decisions on 
government tariff rebates. 
 Household optimization for the home country may be written: 
0
0
max , ,t tt t
t t
ME U C l
P


     
where utility is defined by 
1 11 1ln
1 1
t
t t t
t
MU C l
P
 
 
     , 
subject to the budget constraint:  
      *1 1 1 1 1 1 1t t t t Ht Ht t Ft Ft t t t t Ht t Ft t Bt tPC M M B B e B B Wl i B i B PAC T                  . 
In the utility function, the parameter σ denotes risk aversion and ψ is the inverse of the Frisch 
elasticity. The constraint includes a small cost to holding foreign bonds 
 2
2
B t Ft
Bt
t Ht Ht
e B
AC
Pp y
 , 
scaled by B , which is a common device to assure long run stationarity in the net foreign asset 
position, and resolve indeterminacy in the composition of the home bond portfolio. The bond 
adjustment cost is a composite of goods that mirrors the consumption index, with analogous 
demand conditions to equation (4)-(9).  
 Defining t t tPC
  , household optimization implies an intertemporal Euler equation: 
(10) 
1
t
  1 it Et 1t1



  
a labor supply condition:
 
 
(11) t t tW l   
a money demand condition: 
(12) 
1 t
t t
t
iM
i
      , 
 t
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and a home interest rate parity condition: 
(13)    *t t+1 tt t B t t
t+1 t t+1
  E 1+i 1+ =E 1+it ft
Ht Ht
e Be
e p y
  
                  
. 
 The problem and first order conditions for the foreign household are analogous. 
 
2.3 Home firm problem and entry condition in the differentiated goods sector 
 In the manufacturing sector, the production of each differentiated variety follows 
(14)       1, ( )t D t t ty h G h l h      , 
where ,D t  is a  productivity shock specific to the production of differentiated goods but 
common to all firms within that sector, lt(h) is the labor employed by firm h, and ( )tG h  is a 
composite of differentiated goods used by firm h as an intermediate input. ( )tG h is specified 
as an index of home and foreign differentiated varieties that mirrors the consumption index 
specific to differentiated goods ( ,D tC ). If we sum across firms, ( )t t tG n G h  represents 
economy-wide demand for differentiated goods as intermediate inputs, and given that the 
index is the same as for consumption, this implies demands for differentiated goods 
varieties analogous to equations (6)–(7). 
(15,16)       , ,( ) /G t t D t td h p h P G    , , ,( ) /G t t D t D t td f p f T P G  
 Differentiated goods firms set prices  tp h subject to an adjustment cost: 
(17)     
   2
,
1
1
2
t t tP
P t
t t
p h p h y h
AC h
p h P


     
, 
where P  is a calibrated parameter governing the degree of price stickiness. For the sake 
of tractability, we follow Bilbiie et al. (2008) in assuming that new entrants inherit from 
the price history of incumbents the same price adjustment cost, and so make the same 
price setting decision.3   
There is free entry in the sector, but, once active, firms are subject to an exogenous 
death shock. Since all differentiated goods producers operating at any given time face the 
                                                 
3 The price index for adjustment cost is identical to the overall consumption price index, implying demands 
analogous to those for consumption in equations (4)-(9). See the supplementary online appendix for the full 
list of equations. 
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same exogenous probability of exit  , a fraction   of them exogenously stop operating 
each period.  The number of firms active in the differentiated sector, nt, at the beginning of 
each period evolves according to:  
(18)   1 1t t tn n ne    , 
where net denotes new entrants.  
To set up a firm, managers incur a one-time sunk cost, Kt, and production starts 
with a one-period lag. This cost is not constant but varies reflecting an entry congestion 
externality, represented as an adjustment cost that is a function of the number of new firms:  
(19)  
1
t
t
t
neK K
ne


     , 
where K  indicates the steady state level of entry cost, and the parameter   indicates how 
much the entry cost rises with an increase in entry activity. The congestion externality 
plays a similar role as the adjustment cost for capital standard in business cycle models, 
which moderates the response of investment to match dynamics in data. In a similar vein, 
we calibrate the adjustment cost parameter,  , to match data on the dynamics of new firm 
entry.4 Entry costs are specified either in units of labor (if K =1) or in units of the 
differentiated good (if K =0).   If entry costs are in units of differentiated goods, the 
investment-driven demand is distributed analogously to demands for consumption of 
differentiated goods:  
(20)      , ,( ) / 1K t t D t t K td h p h P ne K    
(21)      , , ,( ) / 1K t t D t D t t K td f p f T P ne K   . 
 We now can specify total demand facing a domestic differentiated goods firm: 
(22)    , , , , , ,( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t G t K t A C P t A C B td h c h d h d h d h d h      
which includes the demand for consumption ( ( )tc h ) by households, and the demand by 
firms for intermediate inputs ( , ( )G td h ), investment (the sunk entry costs) ( , ( )K td h ), and 
goods absorbed as adjustment costs for prices ( , , ( )AC P td h ) and bonds holding costs 
                                                 
4 The value of steady state entry cost K  has no effect on the dynamics of the model, and so will be 
normalized to unity. 
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( , , ( )AC B td h ). There is an analogous demand from abroad  *td h . We assume iceberg trade 
costs D for exports, so that market clearing for a firm’s variety is:  
(23)        *1t t D ty h d h d h   , 
Firm profits are computed as: 
(24)              * * ,t t t t t t t t t p th p h d h e p h d h mc y h P AC h     . 
where   1 1, ,1 /t D t t D tmc P W        is marginal cost. 
Thus the value function of firms that enter the market in period t may be 
represented as the discounted sum of profits of domestic sales and export sales:  
       
0
1
s t s
t t t s
s t
v h E h  




     ,  
where we assume firms use the discount factor of the representative household, who owns 
the firm, to value future profits. With free entry, new producers will invest until the point 
that a firm’s value equals the entry sunk cost: 
(25)     ,1t K t K D t tv h W P K    , 
recalling =1 is the case of entry costs in labor units, and  =0 the case of goods units. 
By solving for cost minimization we can express the relative demand for labor and 
intermediates as a function of their relative costs: 
(26)  ,
( )
( ) 1
D t t
t t
P G h
W l h

  . 
 Managers optimally set prices by maximizing the firm value subject to all the 
constraints specified above.  The price setting equation: 
(27) 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 2
1 1 1
2
1 11
11 1
1 2 1
1
1
t t tP
t t t P
t t t
t tP t
t
t t t
p h p h p h
p h mc p h
p h p h p h
p h p h
E
p h p h
   
 
  
 
              
         
 
expresses the optimal pricing as a function of the stochastically discounted demand faced 
by producers of domestic differentiated goods, 
K K
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    
        
, , , , ,
,
*
, * * * * * *
, , , , ,*
,
1
1
1 1
t
t D t t t K t P D t B D t
D t
D D t t
D D t t t K t P D t B D t t
t D t
p h
C G ne K AC AC
P
T p h
C G ne K AC AC
e P



   


          
             
. 
This sums the demand arising from consumption, use as intermediate inputs, sunk entry 
cost, price adjustment costs, and bond holding costs.  
Under the assumption that firms preset prices in own currency, i.e., assuming producer 
currency pricing, the good price in foreign currency moves one-to-one with the exchange rate, 
net of trade costs:  
(28)       * 1 /t D t tp h p h e  , 
where recall the nominal exchange rate, e, measures home currency units per foreign.   
Note that, since households own firms, they receive firm profits but also finance the 
creation of new firms. In the household budget, the net income from firms may be written: 
   t t t t tn h nev h   . 
In reporting our quantitative results, we will refer to the overall home gross production of 
differentiated goods defined as:  ,D t t ty n y h . 
 
2.4  Home firm problem in the undifferentiated goods sector 
In the second sector firms are assumed to be perfectly competitive in producing a 
good differentiated only by country of origin. The production function for the home non-
differentiated good is linear in labor:  
(29) , , ,H t N t H ty l , 
where ,N t  is stochastic productivity specific to this country and sector. It follows that the 
price of the homogeneous goods in the home market is equal to marginal costs: 
(30) , ,/H t t N tp W  . 
An iceberg trade cost specific to the non-differentiated sector implies prices of the home 
good abroad are 
(31)  * , , 1 /H t H t N tp p e  . 
Analogous conditions apply to the foreign non-differentiated sector. 
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2.5  Monetary policy 
To compute the Ramsey allocation, we posit that the monetary authority maximizes 
aggregate welfare of both countries: 
1 1 *1 *1
0
0
1 1 1 1 1 1max
2 1 1 2 1 1
t
t t t t
t
E C l C l       
    

                   
under the constraints of the economy defined above. As common in the literature, we write 
the Ramsey problem by introducing additional co-state variables, which track the value of 
the planner committing to a policy plan.  
 We also study a “no-policy” case with a constant money growth rule:  
(32) 
1
t
t
M
M


 . 
 as well as a Taylor rule of the form 
(33)       
1
1
1
1 1 1
ip Y
i t t
t t
t
p h Yi i i
p h Y
 




                 
, 
where terms with overbars are steady state values. In this rule, inflation is defined in terms 
of differentiated goods producer prices, while Yt is a measure of GDP defined net of 
intermediates as:5 
(34)     
0
( 1/ (1 )
, , ,
)(1 ) /
tn
t t t D t t H t H t ttY p h y h dh P G p y Pn
       
  . 
Across these different specifications of monetary policy, we will abstract from 
public consumption expenditure, so that the government uses seigniorage revenues and 
taxes to finance transfers, assumed to be lump sum. Government transfers are also used to 
rebate to consumers the tariff duties paid to the government by consumers and firms on 
imported goods. The government budget constraint thus is specified:  
(35)       *1 , 1 , , , , , ,1 ( ) 1t t t D t t t N t F t P F t B F tT M M T n d f T C AC AC         .  
 
2.6  Market clearing 
                                                 
5 For computational simplicity, the Taylor rule is specified in terms of deviations of GDP from its steady 
state value, which is distinct from the output gap. 
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 The market clearing condition for the manufacturing goods market is given in equation 
(22) above.  Market clearing for the non-differentiated goods market requires: 
(36)   * * *, , , , , , , , , , ,1H t H t P H t B H t N H t P H t B H ty C AC AC C AC AC        
(37)   * * * *, , , , , , , , , , ,1F t N F t P F t B F t F t P F t B F ty C AC AC C AC AC       . 
Labor market clearing requires: 
(38)   ,
0
tn
t H t K t t tl h dh l ne K l   . 
Bond market clearing requires: 
(39) * 0Ht HtB B   
(40) * 0.Ft FtB B   
Balance of payments requires:  
(41)     
           
     
*
* * * * * *
, , , , ,
0 0
* * * *
, , , , , , 1 , 1 1 , 1 , , 1 , , 1 .
t tn n
t t t t Ht H t P H t B H t
F t F t P F t B F t t H t t t F t H t H t t F t F t
p h d h dh p f d f df P C AC AC
P C AC AC i B ei B B B e B B     
   
        
   
 
2.7  Shocks process and equilibrium definition 
 Shocks are assumed to follow joint log normal distributions. In the case of 
productivity, for instance, we can write: 
 , , 1
, , 1
log log log log
log log log log
D t D D t D
A At
N t N N t N
       


               
 
with autoregressive coefficient matrix A , and the covariance matrix 'At AtE     .  Foreign 
productivity follows an analogous process. In the case of tariffs, we can write 
 
, , 1
* * * *
, , 1
, , 1
* * * *
, , 1
log log log log
log log log log
log log log log
log log log log
D t D D t D
D t D D t D
T Tt
N t N N t N
N t N N t N
T T T T
T T T T
T T T T
T T T T
 




                             
 
with autoregressive coefficient matrix T , and the covariance matrix 'Tt TtE     .   
A competitive equilibrium in our world economy is defined along the usual lines, 
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as a set of processes for quantities and prices in the home and foreign country satisfying: 
(i) the household and firms optimality conditions; (ii) the market clearing conditions for 
each good and asset, including money; (iii) the resource constraints—whose specification 
can be easily derived from the above and is omitted to save space. 
 
2.8  Model calibration 
Where possible, parameter values are taken from standard values in the literature. 
Risk aversion is set at ; labor supply elasticity is set at  following Hall 
(2009). Parameter values are chosen to be consistent with an annual frequency—the 
frequency at which sectoral productivity data are available. Accordingly, time preference 
is set at .  
To choose parameters for the differentiated and non-differentiated sectors we draw 
on Rauch (1999). We choose  so that differentiated goods represent 55 percent of U.S. 
trade in value. We assume the two countries are of equal size with no exogenous home 
bias, , but allow trade costs to determine home bias ratios. To set the elasticities of 
substitution for the differentiated and non-differentiated goods we draw on the estimates by 
Broda and Weinstein (2006), classified by sectors based on Rauch (1999). The Broda and 
Weinstein (2006) estimate of the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods 
varieties is =5.2 (the sample period is 1972-1988). The corresponding elasticity of 
substitution for non-differentiated commodities is = 15.3. 
The price stickiness parameter is set at p =40, a value implies in simulations of a 
productivity shock that approximately half the firms resetting price during the first year.  
The firm death rate is set at , which is four times the standard rate of 0.025 to reflect 
the annual frequency. The mean sunk cost of entry is normalized to the value K =1. The 
share of intermediates in differentiated goods production is set to a modest value of  
=1/3.6 
                                                 
6 There is a wide range of views regarding the appropriate calibration for this parameter. Jones (2007) 
suggests a value of 0.43 for the share of intermediates, and it is common in the related literature to use a 
value at 1/2. We will consider a range of values for this parameter in sensitivity analysis, but we use a 
modest value of this parameter for our benchmark model. 
2  1/ 1.9 
0.96 

0.5 


0.1 
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 To set trade costs, we calibrate D so that exports represent 26% of GDP, as is the 
average in World Bank national accounts data for OECD countries from 2000-2017.7 This 
requires a value of D =0.33.8 This is similar to the value of trade costs typically assumed by 
macro research, such as 0.25 in Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2001.  But it is small compared to some 
trade estimates, such as 1.7 suggested by Anderson and van Wincoop 2004, and adopted by 
Epifani and Gancia (2017). As shown later on, sensitivity analysis to a wide range of values for 
the trade cost suggests that our results are robust to calibrations implying trade shares both 
much higher and much lower than in our benchmark calibration. We begin with the standard 
assumption of trade models that the homogeneous good is traded frictionlessly ( N ), but we 
will consider a range of values for this parameter also in sensitivity analysis.  
 The benchmark simulation model specifies entry costs in units of goods ( =0) but 
we will also report results for entry costs in labor units in our sensitivity analysis (see the 
discussion in Cavallari, 2013). The adjustment cost parameter for new firm entry, , is 
taken from Bergin and Corsetti (2019), chosen to match the standard deviation of new firm 
entry in the benchmark simulation to that in data.  
 Currently all tariff variables are calibrated with a mean value of 1.05 (5 percentage 
point mean tariff rate).  A shock raises the tariff rate 2 percentage points, with an 
autoregressive parameter of 0.9. 
 
3.  Optimal policy in the one-sector version of the model 
 We begin our analysis focusing on the one-sector version of our model, as this is 
close to the standard specification in the macroeconomic literature on tariff shocks. We 
assume that both countries produce differentiated goods, and shut down the non-
differentiated goods sector by setting 1  . We will report simulations for two types of 
shocks: first, we study a symmetric rise in tariff in both countries---the case of a trade war 
with full retaliation; second, we study a unilateral foreign tariff on home exports, in order 
to gain insight on the response of the exchange rate and trade balance.9 In all cases we 
                                                 
7 See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS?locations=OE. 
8 To coincide with standard accounting definitions, differentiated goods used as intermediates are included 
in the measure of exports, and excluded in the measure of GDP, as is appropriate.  
9 The case of a symmetric global shock is modeled by drawing a single shock and feeding it directly into 
the tariff processes for both home and foreign differentiated goods. This is equivalent to setting the four 
elements in the upper left quadrant of the covariance matrix for the joint shock process equal to a common 
K

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consider a rise in tariffs by 2 percentage points above their 5% steady state level, with an 
autoregressive coefficient of 0.9. 
 
3.1  Optimal stabilization in a tariff war with full retaliation  
 In figure 1, we report impulse responses to an unexpected rise in tariffs in both 
countries, contrasting the cases of “no-policy” (dashed), “flexible prices” (dotted), and 
“optimal policy” (solid), where the “no policy” case is obtained by imposing a constant 
money growth rule. The first two cases allow us to set the stage for our main contribution, 
characterizing economic dynamics under efficient stabilization of the shock. 
 
3.1.1 The transmission of symmetric tariff shocks 
  Under a suboptimal money growth rule (“no policy”), a symmetric tariff shock 
raises inflation and causes a recession---a standard result in the recent literature.  The price 
index rises both because of the direct effect of tariffs paid on imported consumption goods, 
and because the indirect effect of tariffs on imported inputs used by firms---as higher 
marginal costs of production are passed on by firms to consumption prices.   
GDP falls by more than a full percentage point. Higher tariffs depress output via 
several channels. Perhaps the clearest channel is the rise in the price of imported goods 
used in the round-about production structure. Higher marginal costs of production drive up 
prices and reduce demand for firms’ output. A different channel operates via the rise in 
entry costs, also reflecting higher prices of imported inputs. Higher entry costs are 
responsible for the sharp fall in firm entry (a fall in investment demand), and the 
progressive reduction in the number of firms, apparent from Figure 1. Indirectly, a lower 
number of firms and product varieties also contributes to raising inflation, measured with 
the welfare-relevant price index. Observe that the drop in the number of firms is quite 
persistent, and this conveys a high degree of persistence to the fall in GDP.  
Consumption demand also falls sharply and persistently. In part, consumption falls 
with the loss of real income due to higher prices (real wages tank on impact). In part, 
household smooth spending intertemporally, acting on expectations that tariffs will abate in 
                                                 
variance, with all other elements zero. The autroregressive matrix is diagonal. The case of a unilateral 
shock is specified by setting just the second diagonal element of the covariance matrix as nonzero. 
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the future, bringing down consumption prices. Intertemporal substitution thus lowers 
current consumption on top and above current income effects (see Erceg et al., 2018 for a 
detailed discussion of this channel.)  
Nominal rigidities do amplify the effect of tariff shocks. Focus on impulse 
responses under flexible prices, marked with dotted lines in Figure 1. Relative to the no-
policy scenario, the fall in GDP and the number of firms is about a third lower. This 
difference mainly stems from the fact that, in the presence of nominal rigidities, firms do 
not pass through lower wage costs on prices, counteracting the direct effect of the tariff. 
Note that, on impact, inflation is initially higher under sticky prices than under flexible 
prices (inflation rises by 0.39 versus 0.34 percentage points)---as the tariff is added directly 
to the price charged to consumers.   
 
3.1.2 Economic dynamics under optimal monetary expansion 
We now come to the main contribution of this paper, characterizing the optimal 
monetary policy response to the tariff-induced macroeconomic slowdown cum inflation. As 
shown by the solid lines in Figure 1, the cooperative optimal monetary policy response is 
expansionary: the nominal interest rate falls markedly in both countries. This policy 
response mitigates by half the fall in GDP compared to the no-policy case, while it 
exacerbates slightly the rise in inflation in the initial period (from 0.39% to 0.41%).  The 
overall expansionary monetary stance may seem surprising, in light of the fact that tariff 
shocks are typically portrayed as supply shocks (see e.g. Barattieri et al., 2018, for a 
detailed discussion).  After all, the impact of the tariff under no-policy, where a fall in 
output corresponds to a rise in prices, would seem consistent with such an interpretation.  
But the optimal monetary policy prescription in the presence of an inflationary supply 
shock involves monetary contraction, not an expansion. Perhaps this argument has 
motivated the specification of Taylor rules with a large coefficient on inflation relative to 
GDP in related literature (Erceg et al. (2018) and Barattieri et al. (2018)). As a result, 
recent papers tend to ascribe to the monetary policy response a role in amplifying the 
effects of tariff shocks on macro aggregates.   
A monetary contraction is appropriate when the supply shock that drives up 
inflation is a fall in productivity. In this case, monetary tightening serves to eliminate the 
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sticky price distortion, by bringing demand down to the level of GDP that would prevail 
under flexible prices and wages, at the new, lower, level of productivity. In other words, a 
fall in demand and output is efficient when total factor productivity falls for exogenous 
reasons. However, the same logic does not apply to a tariff shock. Note that, in Figure 1, 
there is a wide gap in impulse responses in the optimal policy and the flexible price 
allocations.  The optimal policy most definitely is not aiming to replicate the flexible price 
allocation. To the contrary, policy aims to reduce the effects of the tariff on macro 
aggregates far more than required to compensate for nominal rigidities. Rather than 
eliminating sticky-price distortion, monetary policy takes advantages of nominal rigidities 
in order to increase macro aggregates over the short run, and so improve social welfare.  
When the tariff shock is symmetric across countries, it should not come as a 
surprise that the optimal cooperative monetary response does not eliminate the relative 
price distortion of the tariff on the relative price of exports and imports---nor aim to 
manipulate the exchange rate. Rather, the policy focuses on stimulating domestic demand 
in each country, as to replace the exports lost because of higher trade costs. 
Essential to understanding the motivation for the monetary policy expansion is the 
fact that the tariff distortion shifts expenditure away from imported goods toward domestic 
goods, thus sacrificing efficient gains from trade. The shortfall in production arises largely 
because of the price rise forced on producers, not warranted in terms of fundamental 
productivity or shipping technology---the tariff moves the equilibrium away from an 
efficient allocation. Although tariff duties are rebated back to a country’s residents, 
consumers and firms respond to the rise in the relative price of imports.  The demand for 
imported goods is inefficiently low. In the case of a symmetric tariff war, monetary policy 
cannot directly redress the relative price distortion. However, it can indirectly offset the 
distortion by pushing demand and overall production up, closer to their efficient, higher 
levels.  
The optimality of a monetary expansion is a robust result. In Figure 2, we redo our 
analysis using alternative versions of our model, shutting down, respectively, roundabout 
production and firm entry. Regardless of whether domestic production requires imported 
inputs, and whether there are firm dynamics, the optimal policy prescribes a similar degree 
of interest rate cuts in response to the tariff shock.  Dynamic adjustment is understandably 
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different across these exercises. Note that without firm entry the persistence of the shock is 
visibly lower. The policy rate, in this case, dynamically rises after the initial fall, reflecting 
a stronger concern with the inflationary impact of the optimal response to the tariff. Besides 
the case shown in Figure 2, under no calibration using the one-sector version of our model 
did we find a case in which the optimal monetary policy is contractionary. We will return 
to this point later, when we use our complete model.   
 
3.2  Responding to a unilateral tariff shock 
We now consider the case when the tariff shock is unilateral, i.e. the foreign country 
imposes a tariff on home exports, but home does not retaliate. Clearly, an asymmetric 
shock and possibly asymmetric policy responses are bound to affect variables such as the 
exchange rate and trade balance, which did not come into play in response to symmetric 
shocks across countries. But would the home monetary response switch from expansionary 
to contractionary, redressing inflation rather than the output gap in the short run? 
The economic dynamics under the no-policy scenario (dashed line) in Figure 3 
show that the foreign tariff results in a foreign trade surplus (home trade deficit). The effect 
on home GDP is distinctly contractionary: the fall in home export demand (to a large extent 
driven by expenditure switching effects of higher post-tariff prices) impacts on 
consumption and firm entry investment demand. Note that the response of foreign GDP is 
an order of magnitude smaller than the response of home GDP---and the sign of the 
response is quite sensitive to calibration. As discussed by Erceg et al. (2018), foreign GDP 
may rise or fall, depending upon whether the fall in consumption demand due to 
intertemporal incentives is dominated by the rise in foreign export demand due to the 
expenditure switching effect of relative prices.  In our benchmark calibration, foreign GDP 
actually rises, as the expenditure switching effect dominates. We should note in this respect 
that in our calibration the trade elasticity is somewhat higher than typical, since it is pinned 
down by the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties, be they home or foreign 
varieties. The experiments reported in Figure 4 (dashed line) indicate that if we reduce this 
elasticity of substitution slightly, from 5.2 to 4, the expenditure switching effect abates 
enough that the response of the foreign GDP to the tariff is negative.  
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In response to a unilateral tariff on home exports, the home exchange rate 
depreciates, as shown in Figure 3. But the rate of depreciation in our environment is not 
large enough to offset the impact of the tariff on the relative price of home exports to home 
imports, as predicted by the well-known “Lerner symmetry result.” In a recent discussion 
of this result, Linde and Pescatori (2019) point out that, in its stronger form, the Lerner 
symmetry fails to be complete in many macroeconomic contexts, due to factors such as 
nominal rigidities and asset market spillovers. Our impulse responses indicate that 
endogenous exchange rate movements offset about half of the effect of the tariff on the 
terms of trade.  In the no-policy scenario, the currency depreciation is not driven by 
movements in the short run policy rates, but by the equilibrium response in nominal and 
real rates across countries, reflecting the change in consumption and thus in stochastic 
discount factors. 
Optimal monetary policy is sharply different in the unilateral tariff case relative to 
the symmetric case studied earlier, highlighting new channels and mechanisms. In Figure 3, 
economic dynamics under the optimal policy is depicted with a solid line. In response to 
the tariff, the optimal cooperative policy prescribes substantial monetary expansion at 
home (lower home interest rates) but a rise in the foreign interest rate, although by an order 
of magnitude smaller than the change in the home interest rate. The reason for this 
asymmetric monetary stance is to engineer enough home currency depreciation, to offset 
optimally the impact of the tariff on the terms of trade. Note that, in Figure 3, the home 
terms of trade remain virtually unaffected on impact.  If only temporarily, the optimal 
policy restores the Lerner symmetry result for the exchange rate!  
As in the previous subsection, the optimal policy response moves opposite to strict 
inflation targeting or to a Taylor rule with a large weight on inflation: as it engineers a large 
depreciation, it actually exacerbates home inflation. In pursuing the optimal trade-offs 
among objectives, the optimal policy clearly does not aim to replicate the flexible price 
allocation. On the contrary, it brings most macro aggregates to overshoot their flex-price 
levels (dotted lines in the figure) substantially. By way of instance, the optimal monetary 
policy is not limited by the need to keep home GDP in line with the contraction the home 
country would experience under the “natural rate”: on impact, it almost fully reverses the 
negative effect of the tariff on activity. Similarly, the rise in foreign GDP under the no-
20 
 
policy scenario is completely reversed. Foreign GDP falls well below the flexible price 
level. Note that, in either country, despite moving economic activity in opposite directions, 
the optimal policy nearly eliminates the large drops in firm entry experienced in the no-
policy case. As already noted, rather than trying to replicate the flexible price allocation, it 
is efficient for monetary authorities to take advantage of sticky prices to manipulate relative 
prices and offset the distinct distortion created by the foreign tariff.  
It may be worth noting that monetary policy cannot (and would not) replicate the 
pre-tariff allocation, i.e. undo the trade distortion, via currency depreciation.  On one hand, 
the optimal rate of exchange rate depreciation is not sufficient to fully restore home GDP to 
the pre-tariff level, especially over time (more so, if the persistence of the tariff shock 
exceeds that of price stickiness). On the other hand, the required cut in home interest rate 
tends to over-stimulate home consumption---and cause a significant aggravation of overall 
inflation in the home country.  
All these results are qualitatively robust to various alternative specifications of our 
model---a sample of which is shown in Figure 5. Note that, barring firm entry (dotted line), 
the need for foreign monetary contraction at an optimum becomes much smaller. 
 
3.3 Discussion 
In all the cases reviewed in this section, in response to tariffs that result in higher prices and 
lower economic activity, the optimal monetary policy trades off higher inflation for higher 
output. For the home country, this is so whether or not the country retaliates to the foreign 
tariff, or whether or not we allow for firm entry. While the tariff shock has both demand 
and supply effects, these effects are distinct from those of a productivity disturbance---
which would call for strict inflation targeting. A tariff shock is also different from a markup 
shock, which would also move output and inflation in opposite directions, but would 
typically be stabilized by containing its inflationary consequences. 
We derive our results assuming cooperation across borders---consistent, if only on 
logical grounds, with modelling tariffs as exogenous shocks. In a non-cooperative 
equilibrium, monetary policy fails to internalize spillovers and will generally act differently 
from the above. Yet, because of the trade cost externality analyzed in our previous paper 
(see Bergin and Corsetti, 2019), policymakers will have a strong incentive to keep the 
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production of a large number of varieties within their borders.  If anything, the monetary 
expansionary response to a tariff will be stronger    
 
4.  Dealing with tariffs in a two-sector environment  
 Most of the work studying the effects of tariffs in the trade literature emphasizes 
reallocation between sectors producing tradables as a source of inefficiency and welfare 
losses. In the macroeconomic literature, sector reallocation is typically envisioned as a 
production shift between tradables and nontradables. In recent work (Bergin and Corsetti 
2019) we have proposed a macro model with two tradable sectors, one producing 
differentiated, the other non-differentiated goods, to bring the study of optimal monetary 
policy to bear on comparative advantage. In this section, we build on this early work, and 
reconsider the transmission of foreign tariffs imposed on home exports, assuming that these 
fall on the differentiated goods only.10 
Relative to our previous result, our new model allows us to track the shift in 
comparative advantage following tariff shocks---which, as depicted in Figure 6, are large. 
The production of differentiated goods in the home country falls by 2.5 percentage points, 
which is twice the size of the fall in output observed in earlier scenarios. This is matched 
by a rise in home production of non-differentiated goods of a similar magnitude. In the 
foreign country, sectoral productions also move, in opposing direction. This result 
highlights that foreign tariffs targeted to home differentiated goods can have significant 
consequences on comparative advantage. At the margin, the foreign country specializes in 
the production of non-differentiated goods, reflecting the “home market effect” widely 
discussed in the trade literature. In this literature such shifts in comparative advantage have 
been associated with an “optimal tariff argument,” by which there are distinct welfare gains 
from specializing in the differentiated goods sector (see Corsetti et al., 2007 and Bergin and 
Corsetti, 2019, for a discussion). 
                                                 
10The trade literature tends to distinguish among tradable sectors varying their exposure to trade.  We 
elaborate on this distinction, by assuming that sectors differ in terms of their exposure to the effects of 
monetary policy:  Firms in the non-differentiated good sector are perfectly competitive and operate under 
flexible prices. Firms in the other sector operate as specified in section 2 and 3 of the paper. As typical in the 
trade literature, we continue to specify the tariff as imposed on the differentiated goods sector. Results for 
tariffs imposed on the non-differentiated sector are available from the authors upon request. 
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The shift in comparative advantage coincides with a significant redistribution of 
differentiated goods firms between countries. The percentage fall in the number of home 
firms is an order of magnitude larger than in the one-sector scenario, and there is a 
correspondingly large rise in the number of foreign firms. We should stress that, compared 
to our results for the one-sector version of the model, the rise in foreign investment demand 
for creating firms fully reverses the implications of the tariff for the trade balance. The 
foreign country now runs a trade deficit and borrows from the foreign country in order to 
facilitate its investment in the differentiated goods sector.  
 The optimal monetary policy for this scenario is qualitatively similar to that in the 
one-sector model. However, the optimal monetary expansion and currency depreciation are 
smaller in magnitude. As a result, under the optimal policy the effects of the tariff on 
macroeconomic aggregates is more pronounced---especially in later periods when price 
stickiness wanes. The large swing in the number of active firms confers a high degree of 
persistence to the effects of the tariff on production allocation, and monetary policy is 
progressively less effective beyond the range of price stickiness.  It also appears that a 
parallel objective of monetary policy to promote international risk sharing may be 
competing with the goal of compensating for the relative price distortion of the tariff. As 
shown in Figure 5, the optimal policy serves in this case to raise home consumption 
relative to the no-policy case, while at the same time lowering foreign consumption.   The 
improvement in home terms of trade helps shift consumption from foreign to home. While 
a home currency depreciation lowering the price of home exports helps reduce the tariff 
relative price distortion, it works against the home gains arising from the terms of trade.  
 As already mentioned, the literature that emphasizes inter-sectoral reallocation 
assumes that the second sector produces goods that are not internationally traded---a recent 
instance is Caliendo et al. (2017) specifically studying the effect of a tariff.  For 
comparison, we can consider this case using our model, by assuming that our non-
differentiated sector produces non-tradables ( 1  ). Simulation results in Figure 7 indicate 
that shifts in comparative advantage are qualitatively similar to those in Figure 6, but about 
half the magnitude. Further, the dynamics in firm entry are much smaller than the two-
traded sector model, and instead are more similar in magnitude to those of the one sector 
model. 
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5. Conclusion 
In the wake of Brexit and the Trump tariff war, central banks have questioned 
what role monetary policy should play in managing economic slowdowns induced by 
tariff shocks.  Given that tariff shocks combine elements of both demand and supply 
shocks, it is unclear whether monetary policy should focus on stabilizing the changes in 
prices induced by a tariff, or stabilizing the output gap implications. This paper studies 
optimal monetary policy responses to tariff shocks in a New Keynesian model that 
includes elements from the trade literature, including global value chains in production, 
and comparative advantage between two traded sectors. Simulations indicate that the 
optimal (cooperative) policy response to a symmetric tariff-war tends to be expansionary, 
stabilizing the output gap at the expense of further aggravating inflation, contrary to the 
standard Taylor rule imposed in most of the related literature. In the case of a unilateral 
tariff shock imposed by a trading partner, optimal policy prescribes a currency 
deprecation to offset the effects of tariffs on relative prices, though it only imperfectly 
offsets effects of the tariff on a broader set of  macroeconomic aggregates. 
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Table 1. Benchmark Parameter Values 
 
Preferences 
 Risk aversion 2   
 Time preference  =0.96 
 Labor supply elasticity 1/ 1.9   
 Differentiated goods share 1, 0.61   
 Non-differentiated goods home bias 0.5   
 Differentiated goods elasticity   = 5.2 
 Non-differentiated goods elasticity  15.3 
 
Technology 
 Firm death rate 0.1   
 Price stickiness 40P   
 Intermediate input share 1/ 3   
 Differentiated goods trade cost D =0.33 
 Non-differentiated goods trade cost N =0 
 Mean sunk entry cost K = 1 
 Firm entry adjustment cost 0.10   
 Bond holding cost  =1xe-6 
 Tariff means 1.05D NT T   
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Figure 1. Impulse responses to a rise in tariff in both countries, one-sector model 
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Vertical axis is percent deviation (0.01=1%) from steady state levels. Horizontal axis is 
time (in years). 
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Figure 1 continued 
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Figure 2. Impulse responses to a rise in tariff in both countries, one-sector model, optimal 
policy for various model specifications 
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Figure 3. Impulse responses to a rise in foreign tariff on home exports, one-sector model 
  
 
  Vertical axis is percent deviation (0.01=1%) from steady state levels. Horizontal axis is 
time (in years). 
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Figure 3 continued 
 
 
  
Vertical axis is percent deviation (0.01=1%) from steady state levels. Horizontal axis is 
time (in years). 
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Figure 4. Impulse responses to a rise in foreign tariff on home exports, one-sector model, 
various model specifications 
  
 
  Vertical axis is percent deviation (0.01=1%) from steady state levels. Horizontal axis is 
time (in years). 
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Figure 5. Impulse responses to a rise in foreign tariff on home exports, one-sector model, 
optimal policy for various model specifications 
  
 
  Vertical axis is percent deviation (0.01=1%) from steady state levels. Horizontal axis is 
time (in years). 
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Figure 6. Impulse responses to a rise in foreign tariff, two-sector model 
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Figure 6 continued 
 
 
  
Vertical axis is percent deviation (0.01=1%) from steady state levels. Horizontal axis is 
time (in years). 
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Figure 7. Impulse responses to a rise in foreign tariff, two-sector model, one nontraded 
 
 
 
 
Vertical axis is percent deviation (0.01=1%) from steady state levels. Horizontal axis is 
time (in years). 
 
Vertical axis is percent deviation (0.01=1%) from steady state levels. Horizontal axis is 
time (in years). 
 
